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personally liable as acceptor. The court pointed out that ,the bill
was addressed to him individually, and if not accepted by him individually, was not accepted at all. There was nothing like a disclaimer of personal liability, as might have been the case if the
words "per proc." had been used; and the statement as to consideration merely showed that the company were the parties ultimately indebted. Mare vs. Charles, 25 L. J.Q. B. 119.'
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the ,Southern District
of Ohio-May Term, 1855.
EBERN B. WARD ET AL. vs. PHIILO CHAMBERLAIN ET AL.
1. When two vessels are approaching each other, and the character and course of
either cannot be determined by the watch on board, such vessel should be stopped,
or slowed, until the course of the approaching vessel be ascertained, whether
it be a sail or a steam vessel.
2. Some of the rules of the Trinity masters, intended to apply in navigating a river,
when applied to the open sea, are more likely to produce collisions than to avoid
them.
3. In certain conditions, one vessel is-to keep her course, and the other to avoid
her; how can a concurrence of judgment as to their position, by their respective
masters, be expected, so as to comply with the rule of right, when the wind is
fresh? Uncertainty in this respect produces many collisions.
4. All the rules of navigation should be simple and easily understood.
5. Complicated rules are often misunderstood, and more frequently applied to facts
supposed, which have no existence.
6. So far as my limited experience on this subject enables me to speak, the rules of
navigation recognized, instead of insuring safety, have greatly increased the
us. Per MCLEAN, J.
number f co.li ai

7. If the rule were, that all vessels meeting each other should turn to the right, all
would understand it, and collisions would be avoided. Each vessel, in such case,
would know the course of the other; and if either could not turn as directed, it
would not run in the path of the other. I am aware that this is too simple and
too easily understood for technical lawyers, on the bench or at the bar. It is
the rule on every turnpike road, and such maxims are always founded on common sense.

Per McLEAN, J.

8. When fault may be attributed to two vessels, the damages are divided, and not
apportioned according to the degree of fault.

Emmons, Swayne & iYewberry, for libellants.
Spalding k5 Stanberry, for respondents.
1 20 Lend. Jurist, 489.
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The opinion of the bourt was delivered by
MCLEAN, J.-This is an appeal in admiralty. The libellants allege they were the owners of the steamboat Atlantic, which was engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight between the
port of Buffalo, New York, and that of Detroit, Michigan; that on the
19th of August, 1852, in the evening, she left Buffalo for Detroit with
freight and a large number of passengers; that at half-past two
o'clock on the morning of the 20th August, being on her usual
course off Long Point, on the Canada shore, the propellor Ogdensburgh, of which Robert Richardson was master, then being on lber
way from Cleveland to the entrance of the Welland canal, run into
the Atlantic with great force, the bow of the propeller striking the
larboard side of the Atlantic near the forward gangway, which
opened her side, so that in a short time she sunk in about twentyfive fathoms water.
The respondents say, in their answer, that on the 19th of August,
1S52, the Ogdensburgh, being heavily laden, left the port of Cleveland, between twelve and one o'clock, and proceeded down the lake
by Fairport, in Ohio, towards her port of destination, Ogdensburgh,
New York, through the Welland Canal, in Canada. That at about
two o'clock on the morning of the next day, the propeller being on
her correct course, northeast by east, the wind being light from the
southwe.t, and the weather somewhat hazy, the watch on her deck
discovered a steamboat light, from two to three points on the propeller's starboard bow, at the distance, as was supposed, of about
three miles. The propeller was running about seven miles an hour;
her second mate being on watch, perceived the light was nearing
him rafly, and he gave the signal to slow; and seeing the light
continued to near him, he then made the signal to stop the engine,
and iiiii ediately afterward to reverse it; but, notwithstanding these
precauti ns, a collision ensued.
The true course of the Atlantic, is alleged in the-answer, to have
been, for Detroit, southwest by west, which, if pursued from the
time her light was discovered1, would have taken them near a mile
south of tle propeller.
The cvience is voluminous on both sides. This, if not required,
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is justified by the amount in controversy; and especially by the
deplorable consequences of the collision, which caused the loss of
some one hundred and forty persons.
Omitting matters in detail and incidental, the evidence of the
libellant makes the following case: The Atlantic was a staunch
steamer of the first class, of a capacity to carry upwards of eight
hundred tons, with an engine of a thousand horse power. She had
her complement of officers and men, with her lights brightly burning. At the usual time of departure, between nine.and ten o'clock
at. night, she'left Buffalo for Detroit, loaded with freight, and more
than five hundred passengers. In performing her two weekly trips
between Buffalo and Detroit, the course of the Atlantic was usually
southwest by west, and she was steered that course on the night of
the collision. It was a starlight night, the wind being slight, but a
haze rested upon the lake, which extended upwards some twenty or
thirty feet. Th&lights of a vessel could be seen some five or six
miles.
The course of the Atlantic lay near Long Point, which projects
into the lake on the Canada side, on the point of which there is a
light house, and which is some sixty or seventy miles from Buffalo.
After making Long Point, the Atlantic was some fifteen or twenty
minutes in running abreast of it, her course being changed onefourth of a point to the southward. At this place the former course
of southwest by west was resumed. The officer of the deck, the
second mate, occupied no particular place, but was on the top of the
promenade deck, in the pilot house not to exceed one or two
minutes, on the top of it, on the hurricane deck, sometimes on the
starboard or larboard of the promenade deck.
While standing in the pilot-house, the light of the propeller was
made ; one light was at first seen, then another, both having the
appearance of glimmering stars. They were made on the larboard
bow of the Atlantic, bearing three-fourths of a point. They were
supposed to be lights on a sail vessel. At this time, the signal
lights of the steamer were burning brightly. On seeing the lights
of the approaching vessel, the helmsman of theAtlanticwas ordered
to port her wheel, which was done. Shortly after, from the top of
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the pilot-house, the lights discovered were observed to be nearing
the Atlantic, and, in fact, were close tQ her. The wheel of the
Atlantic was then ordered hard a-port. From the top of the pilothouse, and not before, the approaching vessel, by the reflected lights
of the Atlantic, was discovered to be a propeller. It was then too
late to stop the steamer, and the only chance of escape, as supposed
by the deck officer, was to let her go ahead. The signal lights of
the propeller were looked for, but not seen. The propeller struck
the steamer on the larboard side, which penetrated into the main
hatch and below the water line, through which the water gushed
into the Atlantic, and in one or two minutes her bow sunk, and the
fires -"ere extinguished. The stern remained above the water until
sunrise the next morning.
The respondents' case, as shown by the evidence on their part, is,
the propeller left Cleveland, the 19th of August, 1852; was kept
down the lake near the shore to Grand river, and continued from
that place east-north-east until two o'clock, when she was hauled
off north-east by east. Soon after this change, a light was observed on the propeller, two or two and.one-half points on her starboard bow; and the helmsman was directed to keep her on her
course. The light was supposed to be at a distance of three miles.
T he light approached the propeller, but did not appear to cross her
path. Ia twc or three minutes, the bell was rung to slow the engine, anid in six minutes, more or less, the engine was stopped and
reversed. Seeing that a collision was inevitable, the wheel was then
put hard a-starboard, with the view to break the force of the blow.
By the e:.Ihs of the captain, mate and helmsman of the propeller, at
the time of the collision, her signal and other lights were burning
brightly. The same witnesses siiy, that by the stoppage and reversal of the engine, the force of the propeller was reduced to some
three miles an hour, at the time she struck the Atlantic.
L -., important to ascertain the position and course of the vessel,
immediately before the collision. A map of Lake Erie, made on
actual survey, by the bureau of Topographical Engineers of the
United Stat- , -was used on the trial, on which was marked the
courses as py,.ved to have been run by the respective vessels, from
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Buffalo and Cleveland, up to the time of the collision. This map
is presumed to be accurate.
McNatt, the mate of the propeller, says his watch commenced at
twelve o'clock at night, and that he kept the propeller east-northeast, until two o'clock, and then hauled off from the southern shore
of the lake, north-east by east, and that soon after this change, the
lights of the Atlantic appeared. If McNatt, as he swears, from
twelve o'clock to two; steered the propeller the course she had run,
east-north-east, and then changed to north-east by east, he would
not have passed within ten miles of the place of collision. From
the statement of Captain Richardson, the collision took place some
four or five miles west by south of Long Point, the Atlantic having
passed within about four miles of the light-house. This is only important as showing the inaccuracy of the statements of Captain
Richardson and his mate, McNatt, as to the course of the propeller; and that, -when she struck the Atlantic, her course was from
the southern shore of the lake, at an angle with the course of the
Atlantic, which must have made the larboard lights of the Atlantic,
on the starboard bow of the propeller. As the vessels approached
each other, on the above hypothesis, -the lights would become less
perceptible, and to a person on the deck of the propeller, the Atlantic would seem to be heading on to her. This supposition is
sustained by the evidence in the case, and by the declarations of
McNatt, that his course crossed the path of the Atlantic.
The lights of the propeller, except the signal lights, were made
on the larboard bow of the Atlantic, and the larboard lights of the
Atlantic, including the red light, were made on the starboard bow
of the propeller. The course of the Atlantic was south-west by
west, that of the propeller, as stated by McNatt, was north-east by
east. Now, if the propeller had been running this line, north of
the line of the Atlantic, the lights of the propeller could not be
made on the larboard bow of the Atlantic. It will be recollected
that the lights of both vessels, as at first seen, continued to be displayed, until the moment before the collision. The Atlantic was
running westerly, the propeller easterly, it is alleged, on parallel
line's: now, without a reversal of the order of nature, on this hypo-
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thesis, the starboard lights of the propeller could not be displayed
on the larboard bow of the Atlantic, nor could the larboard lights
of the Atlantic be made on the starboard bow of the propeller.
This sufficiently demonstrates the error of the respondents, in assuming tiat the propeller, when the larboard lights of the Atlantic
were made on her starboard bow, was north .of the Atlantic. And
this is the position taken in the argument.
The hypothesis that the propeller was approaching the path of
the Atlantic, from the south, by an angle which displayed the light
of the prcpeller to the larboard bow of the Atlantic, and caused her
larboard lights to shine on the starboard bow of the propeller, is
consisteiit with the evidence in the case ; and the demonstration
above stated, is conclusive of the fact. It seems to be clear, from
the facts stated, that McNatt intended to pass the bow of the Atlantic. Bat this does not rest upon inference alone; McNatt
repeatedly declared, at different times, in explanation of the collision, .iA immediately after its occurrence, that he did intend to
pass t'e bow of the Atlantic; and that he would have accomplished
his purpose had not that vessel ported her wheel. These remarks
wei e madc at different times and occasions, as shown by some fifteen
or twenty witnesses. Whether the declarations of McNatt, thus
ob considered as evidence in chief, or as discrediting the
te result, under the facts, must be the same.
If these declarations of NcNatt be true, and on one occasion he
Y
.ieir truth by an oath, no one can doubt that the propeller
was south of the line of the Atlantic. Could McNatt wish to pass
the bow oPI a vessel behind him? This determination to cross the
path ef the Atlantic was carried so far as to render the collision
inevitable. Until this was perceived by McNatt, to use his own
be did not apprehend danger.
The right to keep his course was, probably, an afterthought with
M Natt. Seeing the terrible result of his act, it was natural for
him to seek some palliation or excuse. The fact -was attributed to
the Atlantic in porting her helm; but he had a right to keep on his
course. This right he has no doubt claimed from a rule in navigation which, under certain circumstances, allows one of two vessels
'.ord-,
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meeting each other, to keep on her course, while the other is required
to give way. This rule is more calculated to cause collisions than
to avoid them. Is a concurrence of judgment to be expected in the
masters of two vessels approaching each other, as to the conditions
prescribed, even in daylight, and especially at night-? A rule of
navigation, to be effectual, must be simple and positive. It should
be liable to no exceptions. It should be so plain that any man who
knows his right hand from his left, can follow it. " Where two vessels approach each other in opposite directions, each should turn to
the right." Let this be observed and there will be no collisions.
The rule should apply indiscriminately to all vessels, whether propelled by -wind or steam. And if it should happen that one vessel
is unable to turn to the right, the other vessel will never doubt as
to its course, if practicable, and that will be sufficient to avoid her.
Although the officers of the propeller saw the steamer at the distance of three miles, and from her lights knew her character, the
propeller kept on her course; when the vessels approached each
other very near, an order was given to slow the propeller, to stop
the engine, and then to reverse it, which McNatt swears broke the
force of her blow, as she could not have been moving more than at
the rate of three or four miles an hour; but on other occasions, it
is proved he said these measures were taken so short a time before
the collision, as not materially to lessen the force of her movement.
And this would seem to be the fact from the wound inflicted on the
Atlantic. It is true the helm of the propeller was starboarded,
when the vessels were nearly in contact, which.was done, as McNatt
states, not to avoid a collision, but to render the conflict less injurious by a slanting blow.
It is argued that the propeller, under existing circumstances, was
bound to keep her course. That to have thrown her helm a-port,
while the Atlantic was from two to three points on her starboard
bow, would have been a gross violation of the rules of navigation;
and several experts have given their opinion approving of the course
of McNatt.
These opinions were given and the usage stated, on the hypothesis
that the boats were running on parallel lines, that of the Atlantic
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being south of the propeller's. This supposition is shown to be incorrect from the fact that the red light of the Atlantic was seen on
the starboard bow of the propeller, and the lights of the propeller
made thrce-fourths of a point on the larboard bow of the Atlantic.
This would be impossible if the propeller were running on a parallel
line with the Atlantic. That the lights were seen as -stated, no one
can dorbt, as the witnesses on both boats concur.
The captain of the propeller seems to differ from his experts and
the counsel. When he met McNatt on the deck, after the collision,
he inquired of him if he saw the red light of the steamer, and being
answered that he did, with great emphasis, the captain said, "why
did 3 ou not port ?" The Captain knew, as McNatt afterwardss wore,
that the propeller's line was from the southern shore of the lake, and
that it lay across the path of tlie Atlantic.
TLe libel charges that the propeller had not her signal lights
burning, and displayed as the law requires. That the deck officer
of tue Atlantic supposed the lights were on a sail vessel, and that
he .vaswarranted in so judging, and in running the Atlantic, Carney, the watch on the Atlantic, Brigham, an experienced seaman,
who was a passenger, Rose, a fireman, Barry, the wheelman, all on
board the Atlantic, and all of whom saw the approach of the propcLer until she struck the Atlantic, and they all looked for signal
lights, and saw none on the propeller.
Wainer, respondent's witness, was on board the Atlantic; saw
a white light at about 2 o'clock, or after, one point over her larboard bow; thought it was a sail vessel; when the vessels were
within fifty feet .of each other lie then, for the first time, saw a
signal light, he thinks i but is not certain. But, Wells, McPherson,
Barnes, Kenedy, Welsh, Meeler and MeGrain, all hands on board
of tic propeller, and Mr. and Mrs. Ring, passengers on that boat,
concur in saying the signal lights were nearly out, and could not
be seen more than a few rods.
It is true that McNatt and Captain Richardson swear that the
signal lights were burning at the time of the collision, and continued
to burn until the propeller landed at Erie. But the facts sworn to
by these witnesses are disproved by so great a number, as to leave
22
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no doubt that the signal lights were so nearly extinguished, as not
to be seen further than one or two lengths of the vessel. McGrain,
whose duty it was to trim the lamps, after the collision, when he
came on deck, the captain ordered him to trim that light, pointing
to the signal light. The witness brushed off the scum or hard crust
that was on the top of the wick of the light, picked it and put it
back in its place. One of the tubes of this signal light was entirely out. The light could not be seen, McGrain says, but little
further than the length of the boat. The signal lights, unless
trimmed by twelve o'clock at night, he says, would not afford a
light more than twice the length of the vessel. They were not
trimmed on the night of the collision, until after it occurred.
Several of the witnesses saw these lamps burning after they were
trimmed. As two white lights were shown by the propeller, it is
argued that the officer of the deck of the Atlantic might have
known they were. not carried by a sail Vessel. But it is proved
that many sail vessels carry two white lights; and it is clear, that
no number of white lights can excuse the want of colored lights
which the law requires every steamer to carry.
On two grounds the propeller is clearly chargeable with fault.
First, when she saw the light of the Atlantic she should have
ported her helm, instead of continuing her course. The assumption
that she was north of the line of the Atlantic is not sustained by
the evidence, and is contradicted by the declarations of McNatt, by
the lights made on the bows of both vessels, which showed the supposition was unfounded, and could not, in the nature of things, he
true. No doubt is entertained that the display of lights is accounted
for by the angle at which the vessels approached each other, and
which is the only hypothesis sustained by the evidence. Had the
propeller ported her wheel, and put it hard-a-port, there would have
been no collision. This would have caused the propeller to pass
the stern of the Atlantic. McNatt was either ignorant of his duty
or perversely wrong, in continuing his course, and especially in his
attempt to pass the bow of the Atlantic. There is no rule of navigation which sustains him, but the contrary. And to this act of
his, more than any other; is the sad calamity to be attributed.
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In the ca c of the Ann &. Mfary, 9 English Admiralty Rep. 195,
the Trinit n.asters
m
say-" We beg to observe to this court, that the
golden rule F long established, must be strictly adhered to ; it is
this, that the larboard tack is to give way, and the vessel on the
starboard tack to hold on." This rule when applied to the open
sea is pregnant with danger, as above observed. It is salutary, no
doubt, whern applied in a narrow river, where its shores show .the
position and course ofOeach vessel. But the masters say, " and the
new rule which has been lately made for steam vessels, namely, each
to put the bi, !m a-port under all doubtful circumstances." This rule
is founded on common sense and common prudence. It was disregarded by the propeller.
But in the second place, the propeller was chargeable with fault,
in not having her signal lights in order. These lights, it is true,
to some exitnt were burning. They were not entirely out, but, for
all practic- purposes, they might as well have been extinguished.
They were o low, aid so encrusted by the atmosphere, that they
could not be seen scarcely twice the length of the boat. It is
true the mate on deck, the captain, and one or two others, swear,
those lights were burning at the time of the collision. After the
colliion, the captain directed McGrain to fix this or these lights.
lie saw the defects, and this order shows it; and it is proved by so
many pr-rsJns on both boats, and especially by those on board the
Atlantic, iho were experienced sailors, and who lobked for the signal lights as the propeller approached but did not see them, that the
force of the evidence is irresistible. One vitness only on the
Atlantic thought he saw one of those lights at the time of the collision, but i- not certain. Until Carney saw the hull of the propeller
on her ne.r approach, by the reflected lights of the Atlantic, he
supposcd the white lights seen were carried by a sail vessel. Had
he bee i w-rned by the signal lights that the approaching vessel was
a steamer, Carney says lie would have stopped his Vesscl. Defective
signal lights, -lIici would not enable an approaching vessel to see
them at such a distance as to avoid a collision, are not lights within
tl.c I ..
'And tis was the condition of the propeller's signal lights
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at the time of the collision. The second ground of fault, in my
judgment, is as clearly established as the first one.
But was the management of the Atlantic faultless? I think it
was not. The objection that the captain, instead of standing his
watch, substituted the second mate, and retired to rest, and was not
seen on deck again until roused by the collision, is not in itself a
fault. In this Captain Pettys, master of the Atlantic, did nothing
more than was usually done by masters of s~amers when the night
is clear and calm. The second mate, under such circumstances, is
often ordered to the deck. The assertion that-the second mate was
incompetent to the duties assigned him, is disproved by a great
number of experts, which relieves the second mate from any just
imputation of ignorance or want of energy.
The Atlantic had in her charge about five hundred passengers.
This imposed upon the officer in command awful responsibilities. It
should have quickened his solicitude and energy in the discharge of
his duties. When he first descried the approaching vessel he put
his helm a-port, and a moment before the contact he ordered it harda-port. Seeing only the white lights, he supposed the vessel carrying them to be a sail vessel. No signal lights indicating it to be a
propeller were seen by him until after the collision, and after the
signal lights had been trimmed.
The experts called by the libellant say that the Atlantic was very
properly kept on her way without any abatement of her speed.
They were right, probably, on the supposition that the propeller
had been a sail vessel. From the slow progress of such a vessel,
the steamer in all probability would have passed her without danger. But had the mate a right to presume the approaching light
to be on a sail vessel, and to act accordingly? Technically, perhaps, he had. But could there be no doubt as to the character of
the approaching vessel? Had Carney a right to hazard the safety
of his passengers on the faithful conduct of the master of the vessel
in view ? The lives of the passengers were ventured on the Atlantic
on the character of the vessel, and the skill and efficiency of its
officers. A trust was reposed in them, and not on the. good conduct or skill of the officers of such vessels as they might meet.
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Under such circumstances, it is not enough for an officer to be within
the rules of navigation so as to charge the wrong on the colliding
vessel.
Notwithstanding this wrong in an approaching vessel,
the peril must be seen and guarded against, by an exercise of
skill and firmness which, under such an emergency, might reasonably be expected from competent officers.
Prudence required, when the lights of the propeller were seen,
that the Atlantic's helm should be ported, and the course of the
approaching vessel ascertained; and if this could not be done except by slowing or stopping her engine, the boat should be checked
or stopped. It is true that a steamer, by the present rules of navigation, may take either the larboard or starboard side of the sail
vessel. This leads to many collisions, as the sail vessel may mistake the intentions of the steamer, and run across her path; but ifeach had to pass the other on the right, there could be no mistake.
In S. John v. Paine, 10 Howard, 557, speaking of the Trinity
rules, the court say: "These rules have their exceptions in extreme
cases, depending upofi the special circumstances of the case, and in
respect to which no general rule can be laid down or applied.
Either vessel may find herself in a position, at the time when it
would be impossible to conform to them without certain peril.
These cannot be anticipated, and therefore cannot be provided for
by any fixed regulation. They can only be examined, and the
management of the vessel approved or condemned, as the case may
arise." And again in Peck v. Sanderson, 17 Howard, 178, the
court say: "Neither can the order to stop the engine and back,
instead of changing the course of the steamship, be regarded as a
fault. It would evidently have been unwise to change the course
until the course of the approaching vessel was ascertained. She
might be approaching at an angle that would clear the steamship,
and a change in the course of the latter might produce a collision,
instead of preventing it."
Carney admitted, that if he had known the approaching vessel
was a propellor, he would have stopped the engine. For the safety
of his boat and passengers, it was important that he should know
the character of the vessel and her course. But he did not stop to
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ascertain either. He judged of the one by the light which appeared,
and of the other, from the light made on his starboard bow. But
he erred in both cases. The approaching boat was running at an
angle to the line of the Atlantic, and, in such case, porting his helm
and then hard-a-port would not, and did not, avoid her.
The commander of a boat has no right to incur any risk which
jeopards the lives of his passengers, and which he may avoid. Had
the, engine of the Atlantic been slowed two minutes, there would
have been no collision. The experts sustain Carney in keeping the
Atlantic at full speed on her course. The opinions of experienced
seamen may be relied on, where there is no mistake in the facts on
which it is founded. They judged, in the present case from the
lights made on the larboard bow of the Atlantic, not knowing
-whether the light so made was from the starboard or larboard light
of the approaching vessel. The fact proved that the larboard lights
of the Atlantic were made on the starboard bow of the propellor,
which showed that the course of the propellor crossed the path of
the Atlantic; and in such a case no prudent man could advise the
Atlantic to keep her course and speed. Under such circumstances
a collision was certain, if the vessels should meet at the point where
the propeller's line crossed that of the Atlantic. When lights are
made, it is always difficult, and often impossible, to tell the course
of the approaching vessel; and until this shall be ascertained, the
vessels should stop their engines. Where the vessels are approaching
each other at an angle, whether they will meet at the angle depends
upon the relative distances and speed of the boats, which no one
can calculate or determine. Under such circumstances, there is no
safety but in the stoppage and reversal of the engines. When vessels are approaching each other in parallel lines, or in the same
lines, the helm of each should be ported.
On the approach of danger, every officer should be called to the
deck, and the master, to whom the vessel is chiefly entrusted, should
take the command. I am aware that this has not been required;
and I am also aware that the destruction of human life has become
so common from collisions of steamboats, that the country look upon
them as ordinary occurrences. The Atlantic cannot be held fault-
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less, as the measures dictated by prudence and necessity were not
taken to avoid the collision.
There is evidence in the case tending to show the most reprehensible and inhuman conduct of Captain Pettys, of the Atlantic,
after the collision. This has been explained, or contradicted, by
other testimony. He is charged with calling, when in the life-boat
of the Atlantic, on the boat of the propeller to come and take him
on that boat, as he was Captain Pettys, of the Atlantic. It seems
Captain Pettys was in the boat, but that it was not he, but another
person, in the same boat, who made the request. It is also stated
that, when on board the propeller, he advised Captain Richardson
not to go to the wreck of the Atlantic with the propeller, as the
passengers were so numerous as to sink her. It is said by other
witnesses, that Pettys expressed much solicitude to save the passengers, and advised Captain Ricbardson to exert himself. Before
Pettys left the sinking vessel, it is charged that he used force to
prevent the passengers from entering the boats until he and his crew
were safe. This is -not proved, except upon very doubtful evidence. Before ha left the boat, Pettys directed her to be listed
down to the starboard, with the view to elevate the wounded part
above the water. The vessel was careened, but it did not save her
from sinking.
Captain Pettys, it is proved, received a severe wound in the head,
directly after the collision, which for a time disabled him; and it
seems he was under medical treatment for some time after his arrival at Erie. He is spoken of by the witnesses as a competent and
popular master. Capt. Richardson says, when the propeller reached
Erie, not being acquainted with the entrance to the harbor, he hesitated about entering it, when Captain Pettys took the command of
the vessel and landed her. If this be so, his wound could not have
been as severe as some of the witnesses supposed. But I cannot
but observe that the haste with -which Captain Pettys left the sinking steamer shows that he had not the moral daring which fitted him
for such a crisis. The captain of a ship should be the last to leave
her; he should go down with her or buffet the waves, rather than
save himself by occupying a place in a life-boat, to the exclusion of
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a passenger. The wound might, perhaps, have influenced the act
of Captain Pettys, and may excuse him in leaving the steamer.
Carney, the second mate, remained on the wreck until after sunrise.
And, from the evidence, it appears all the passengers might have
been saved if they had collected on that part of the stern of the
Atlantic which remained above water, until after sunrise. Captain
Richardson and McNatt, by unremitting and judicious efforts, rescued many of the passengers.
The weight of the responsibility for this great calamity lies on the
propeller. The Atlantic was in fault, but not in the same degree as
the propeller. Where the fault is mAutual, the damages are divided,
and not apportioned by the comparative culpabilities of the parties.
The decree of the District Court is reversed, and a decree will be
entered that the damages stipulated be divided, one-half of which
shall be paid to the libellants by the respondents.
It is not improper to remark, that the additional evidence procured in this case since the decree in the District Court, has greatly
changed its aspect. In the argument, the counsel for the libellants
admitted the decree in that court was correct, on the evidence
before it.

In the Superior Court of Baltimore, January, 1857.
MONTGOMERY VS.'WHITTINGTON,

HOOPER, RICKETTS AND MURPHY.

1. Where one W., the defendant, and one M., the complainant, entered into a contract and agreement whereby the said W. became the agent and trustee of the
said M., to sell his interest in the steamboat Jewess, under certain terms and
upon certain stipulations; and where, in direct violation of the terms of the
contract, co-operating and conspiring with one H., who also owned a moiety of
the steamboat, the said IV. sold to R., his partner, the interest of his'cestui que
trust, and advanced part of the purchase money, the sale being made at a
lower price than had been previously offered, and, within thirty days of the sale,
took, by the Custom House documents, title and possession to himself of a certain interest in the said steamboat, the sale was held void, as being in violation
of the general and universally established doctrine, that trustees are incapable of
purchasing trust property themselves.
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2. The general doctrine of the relations between cestuis que trust and trustees
discussed.
3. The cestai que trust is entitled to the full value of the property at the time of the
sale, as damages, if it is lost or not in a condition to be returned.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEE, J.-In April, 1854, James -Montgomery filed his bill of

complaint in this court, setting forth that on the 9th day of January, 1854, he was possessed of one undivided half of a steamer
called the "Jewess," and that Win. E. Murphy, of Louisiana, was
the owner of the other half; that from some disagreement between
Murphy and himself, a libel was filed for and on behalf of said Murphy, in the District Court of the United States, for the- State of
Maryland, for the purpose of obtaining a sale or division of said
steamer, and that during the pendency of said proceedings, Murphy
transferred, by an absolute bill of sale, his undivided half of said
vessel to one James Hooper, of the city of Baltimore.
That it had become necessary for the payment of claims against
the steamer, to have her sold on terms that would realize a fair price,
and the complainant, yielding to this exigency, agreed to have such
a sale made, and that during the consultation of this subject the
defendant, John Whittington, pursuaded him not to have the sale
made by or under the control of the attorneys of the parties, but
that he, as a merchant, acquainted with the value of vessels, could
effect a better sale and could prevent any sacrifice of the steamer,
and as a return for his services, would ask only 2 3- per cent. for his
commission.
Confiding in the defendant and his.representations, the complainant alleges that he gave him an absolute bill of sale of his undivided
half interest in said "Jewess," and that the steamer, being at that
time in the hands of the marshal, deteriorating in value and incurring expenses, he, without reflection, and from his entire confidence
in the defendant, executed this bill of sale -without naming or reserving any of the trusts or rights it was intended to. secure.
That he afterwards, upon the advice of counsel, required the true
purpose of said bill of sale to be expressed in writing, and that the
defendant accordingly executed and delivered the agreement of trust
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marked (exhibit J. M., No. 1), in the printed record, in the following wordsArticles of agreement made and executed on this ninth day of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, by and between James Montgomery and John Whittington, in relation to the steamer Jewess,
and a bill of sale executed to him this day by the said James Montgomery, for his interest in said. vessel.
It is agreed first, that the said Whittington is to unite with James
Hooper in the sale of the said vessel, and to charge for the sale
two-and-a-half per cent. on the whole vessel, so that he will receive
one-and-a-quarter per cent. and the said Hooper the same. The.
said sale tb be made for one-third cash and the residue for approved
paper, at four, six and eight months, with interest.
But the said sale is not to be made before the twenty-eighth day
of February next, and in the meanwhile, if the said Montgomery
shall purchase from James Hooper his half of the said vessel, then
no sale is to -be made and no commissions charged; but the said
Whittington is to re-convey the said steamer to the said Montgomery wi'hout any further consideration, the said bill of sale having
been m ade-for the said purpose.
And it is further agreed, that if such sale shall be made as aforesaid, the proceeds are to be applied to the payment of commissions
and expenses, .nd afterwards to the payment of all the debts of the
said steamer "Jewess," and the residue to be paid over to the said
James Montgomery and James Hooper, in equal proportions, after
crediting advances made by the said Montgomery and William E.
Murphy, from whom the said Hooper purchased his interest, so that
the said Montgomery and the said Murphy or Hooper shall, before
receiving the residue, after paying debts, have been put upon an
equal footing as to the money already paid for the said steamer; if
the said Whittington shall have to make any advances for the said
steamer, which advances are to be confined to necessary expenses.
It is further agreed, that in case the said James Montgomery shall
object to the payment of any claim, he may suspend the same by
giving security to the said Hooper and the said Whittington, to indemnify them therefrom and against the same, in which case the
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proceeds of the sale may be distributed without reference to any
such claim.
As witness our hands and seals the day and year first aforesaid.
JOHN WHITTINGTON, [SEAL.]
JAMES MONTGOMERY, [SEAL.]
Signed and sealed in presence of
SAMUEL L.

CHAMBERLAIN.

Interlineation, second page, beginning at the weird "if" and
ending at "expenses," being made before signing; and also the
words "and the said Whittington," in the third page, and"the word
"said" in the first page.
SAMUEL L. CHAMBERLAIN."-which expressly authorizes Whittington to act only as agent and
trustee for the complainant, and as such to make a sale ofihis (complainant's) interest in said steamer upon the terms and at the time
therein specified, and after paying the claims against said vessel out
of the proceeds, to pay over the surplus respectively to Hooper, the
holder of Murphy's half, and to Montgomery the complainant.
The bill then alleges that in direct violation of this trust, the
defendant, Whittington, united and conspired with said Hooper, and
that they advertised and offered for sale the steamer, on the 15th
of February, 1854, but, upon the remonstrance and objections of
the complainant, the sale was stopped, and the vessel was withdrawn,
after a bid of $27,500. That, afterward, Hooper and Whittington,
confederating and uniting to injure him did, without his consent,
again advertise the "Jewess" for peremptory sale, on the 1st of
March, 1854, and did not state in the advertisement the terms of
sale, as required by the agreement.
The complainant also states that the defendants, Hooper and
Whittington, well knew, at that time, that the steamer had cost, in
the original purchase and repairs, upwards of $20,000, and that the
debts due by her were, then, not large in amount, yet, notwithstanding, they put her up for sale, on the 1st of March, without notice to
the public of the terms of sale named in the agreement, J. M., No.
1, and that she was struck off, after a languid bidding, with a small
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attendance at the Exchange, and was knocked down at the sum of
$12,500, against the urgent remonstrances of the complainant, who
was present, but unable to arrest the sale or prevent the sacrifice;
and that Wesley Ricketts, the partner of Whittington, became the
purchaser of the steamer at this bid, and on terms different from
those agreed upon and set out in the agreement referred to.
The bill then charges that, after this sale, Ricketts and Whittington took possession of the steamer at once, and that the defendant
Whittington advanced all the money required for her machinery
and repairs; and it is in evidence, and shown by the books of
Ricketts and Whittington, that, on the 2d of March, the day after
the sale, i cash check is charged to the steamer Jewess of $1,000,
i and credited to the firm of Ricketts & Whittington.
And this result, so disastrous, as the complainant alleges, was
brought about through the agency and co-operatioia of Hooper with
the defendant, Whittington, whom he knew was acting solely as the
agent and trustee of the complainant at the time he exacted a bond
from said Whittington to compel a sale at all hazards on the 1st of
March, and charges upon this .statement of the case, a fraudulent
conspiracy between them to deprive him of his just rights and
property in said steamer.
The bill further alleges that Whittington is answerable for the
breach of trust involved in such a procedure, and ought to account

for the real value of the vessel, as it may be shown, and finally
prays, that the sale may be decreed null and void, as being fraudulent and contrary to equity; and that a re-sale shall be directed for
tho purposes intended by the agreement, exhibit J. M., No. 1; and
also prays general relief, &c., &c.
To this bill, the defendants, Whittington, Hooper, Ricketts and
Murphy, have filed their separate answers, generally denying any
fraud, collusion, or mal-conduct in the disposition of the steamer on
the 1st March, and assert that the sale was bona fide, and made
with the consent of Montgomery under the most favorable circumstances, and for her real value; and refer, to support their answer,
to the testimony taken by them in the cause and to be found in
the record.
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These answers, under the' act of assembly, were not required to be
given under oath, and therefore the bill and answers amount only to
an affirmation and denial of the matters and things therein stated,
and must.depend on the proof alone, which in this cause is full and
.voluminous on both sides.
Indeed, much of the testimony has been prbperly excepted to on
several grounds, some of it consisting alone in the expression of
.opinions as to the value of the steamer in controversy.
Before, however, turning to this conflicting evidence upon the
value of the steamer, I shall first examine the most obvious and important question which, "in limine" upon the bill, answers and
conceded facts, presents itself.
It is not denied, but admitted that the absolute bill of sale given
by -Montgomery to Whittington, on the .9th of January, 1854, was
(as afterwards expressed by the articles of agreement filed, as
exhibit J. M., No. 1,) a conveyapce ot fkansfer of the Jewess in
trust,, for the purposes and on the terrasspecifically set forth in this
paper. That Whittington, the trustee and defendant, was only
authorized to act in the sale of said steamer, as the trustee or agent
of the complainant, Montgomery, being- entitled directly to no
other benefit from the execution of the trust than the commissions
of two and a half per cent. upon the proceeds of the sale of said
vessel.
In this, fiduciary character, then, he appears before a court of
chancery and asks the confirmation and approval of the sale made
by him on the 1st of March, 1854.
. The evidence, (uncontradicted,) on both sides, shows that the sale
was not made by Hooper and himself on terms different from those
set out in the agreement J. M., No. 1; and at the sale Wesley
Ricketts, a partner of the defendant Whittington, became the purchaser of the steamer for the sum of $12,500 ; that the first payment on the purchase was made on the 2d of March, by a check of
$1,000 of the firm of Ricketts &Whittington, and that the defendant Whittington immediately thereafter assumed a control over the
said steamer, and exercised some of the rights of ownership.
It is further in proof from the testimony of D. 0. Laws, a 'it-
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ness examined by the defendants, and tlfen in the employ of Ricketts
& Whittington, that he was present when the said Whittington on
the morning of the sale offered to lend Wesley Ricketts, his partner,
the sum of $10,000 to buy the steamer. It is also in proof that
after the purchase by Ricketts, alterations and repairs were made
on the steamer to the amount of $4,052 11, and these were paid for
by Ricketts & Whittington. Thus manifestly showing, that although
momentarily separated, at the sale of 1st of March, yet Whittington
(besides furnishing or offering to furnish $10,000 for the purchase)
united the next'day with Ricketts in paying for the vessel and afterwards for the repairs and alterations, leaving the conclusion irresistible that the purchase was made on their joint account as
partners.
It is true a witness, John Ricketts, (a brother of Wesley Ricketts)
states that Whittington at first declined buying the vessel, and
immediately after the sale hesitated, or to use the expressive language of the witness, "dwelt on the matter." How long he dwelt
can only be accurately determined by the subsequent acts of the
party, for besides paying on the 2d of March, $1,000 on account of
the purchase as stated, it appears that on the 31st of March, not a
month after this sale and purchase, a paper-complainant's exhibit
(A)-was filed in the Baltimore Custom House, which is as follows"Know all men by these presents, That we, John Whittington
and James Hooper, both of the city of Baltimore, State of Maryland, owners of the steamship or vessel called the "Jewess," of
Baltimore, for and in consideration of the sum of twelve thousand
five hundred dollars to us in hand paid at the time of the perfection
of these presents by John Whittington and Wesley Ricketts, both
of the city of Baltimore and State aforesaid, trading under the firm
of Ricketts & Whittington, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold, assigned, transferred and set
over-and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer
and set over unto the said John Whittington and Wesley Ricketts,
their executors, administrators, and assigns all that the said steamship or vessel "1Jewess," of Baltimore, together with all and singular
her masts, yards, sails, rigging, anchors, cable, boats, tackle, apparel
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and appurtenances, as she now is, and is more particularly described
in a certificate of enrollment, granted her at the port of Baltimore,
in the following words:
...-9No. 45 (Forty-Five) Enrollment.)-In conformity to an act
of 4e Congress of the United States of America, entitled 'An
Act for the enrolling and licensing of ships or vessels to be employed
In the coasting trade and fisheries, .and for regulating the same,"
,ohn-Whittington, of Baltimore, State of Maryland, half owner,
having taken or subscribed the oath required by the said act, and
having sworn that he, together with James Hooper, of
seal of the
Tre auer of the

Baltimore, aforesaid, half owners, are citizens of the

Colectorofthe

ship or vessel has one deck and three masts, and that

Sunited
States.
Ue

United States, sole owners of the ship or vessel called
Jewess," of Baltimore, whereof L. D. Morgan is at presentmaster,
and as he hath sworn is a citizen of the United States, and that the
said ship or vessel -was built in Baltimore, aforesaid, in the yeor
eightvenix-qdre.d indthirtyeine, (1839,) as appears by a certificate
of dilrolment, No.: 7; granted at this port the seventh January, now
surrendered owners changed.
And
said
certificate
having
certified
that
the said
•SWa of the
her length is two hundred. feet, her breadth twenty-

two feet ten inches, her depth nine feet two inches, and that she
measures four hundred and ten tons and ninety-five parts of a ton;
that she is a steamship; has a square stern; no galleries, and plain

li6aa.

"

And the said owners having agreed to the descripNaI ofler ftion and admeasurement above specified, and sufficient
S.

.
security having been given according to the said act,
the said steamship .having been -duly enrolled at the poit of
'Baltimore.
Given unddr our hands and seals at the port of Baltimore, this
eighth day -of March, in the year one thousand eight thousand and
•fifty-four."
To have and to hold the said steamship or vessel called the
"Jbwess," of Baltimore, and the appurtenances thereunto belonging, unto the said John Whittington and Wesley Ricketts, their
0
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executors, administrators and assigns, to the only proper use and
behoof, and as the proper goods and chattels of the said John Whittington and Wesley Ricketts, their executors, adminitrators and
assigns, from henceforth, forever;, and we, the said John Whittington and James Hooper, for ourselves, our executois and assigns, do
hereby covenant and agree to, and with the said John Whittington and Wesley Ricketts, their executors, administrators and
assigns, that"at the execution of these presents, we are the true and
lawful owners of the said steamship called-the "Jewess," of Baltimore, and appurtenances, and have full right and authority to
sell and dispose of the same, freed from and cleared of all claims,
incumbrazices or demands whatsoever.
In witness whereof,-wehave hereunto set our hands and seals, the
thirty-first day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and fifty-four.

JOHN- wHI'TIGTONI [swA.]
JAMES HOOPER,-- -Signed, sealed and delivered
of
in the presenie ofj THOM" M. MoRiMs.
True copy,

PHILIP F. THOMAS, Qgofcor.'-

-wherein Whittington and Hooper, calling themselves the osmers
of the steamer Jewess, for and in consideration of 12,500, acknowledged to be paid to them by John Whittington and Wesley Bicketts,
"grant, sell and transfer'"to -Whittingtou and Ricketts, trading

under the firm, &c., of-Ricketts &Whittington, the said steamer
"Jewess," her tackle, apparel, &c., fully and absolutely.
Without referring further to the testimony in the record showing
other acts of ownership and control on the part of Whittington over
this steamer, I might well pause, sitting here as a chancellor, and
ask what-reply or construction can be given to this documentary
and conclusive evidence of Whittington's interest in hcr, other than
that-which I must adopt. This document speaks trumpet-tongued
in establishing, beyond all controversy, Whittingtou's interest in the
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purchase of the "Jewessr" and his part ownership with Ricketts,
not a month after the sale.
And this fact being proved, beyond the possibility of cavil or
doubt, the question now recurs, which I shall examine by the
lights of judicial authority in England and this country, can a trustee directly or-indirectly become a purchaser of, or. be interestedin
the sale of trust property confided to him, or can he in any way
afterwards acquire an interest therein ?
Before looking at the adjudicated cases on this subject, and apart
from the conclusive authorities in England, embracing the opinions
of the most eminent chancellors, from Lords Hardwicke, Eldon, ana"
others, to the present, time, the, rile established by them is most
clearly defined by Sir Edward.Sugden. (See Sugden on Vendors and
Vendees, 2d section, p. 0 9 ; Vol.2, p. 887, 11 Lond.ed. 184q.) .It
may be laid down," says that able writer, f"as a general propositio.a
that trustees, (unless they are nominally such, to preserve contingent
remainders) are iwcapable -of purchasing the trust property thems.elves, unless under restraints which courts of equity-impose, for if
personw of confidential character.were permitted to avail themselves
oftany knowledge acquired in that capacity i they might be induced to
conceal-their information, and not to exercise it for the benefit of persons relying on their integrity. The characters 'are inconsistent.
'KEmptor emit quam minimo potest venditor vendit quam 'aaimoa
poteat." This principle is to be found broadcast through all the decisions in which the relation of trustee and egstui que trust are at all
discussed. See Fox vs. Macketh, 2 Brown's Chancery: Cases, 400i.
Bakei v6. Carter,1 Younge & Collyer, 252; Campbellvs. Walj]er,
5 Vesey, 679; .Exparte, Lacey, 6 Vesey, 627 ; Lister vs. Lister
1 Younge & Collyer, 629; Killock vs. .Pezney,4 Brown's C. 0.47;
Exparte James; 8 Vesey, 837 ; Lowther vs. Lowther, 13 Vesey,
603; Whitcomb vs. Minchin,.5 Maddox, 91; Murphy-vs. O' hea,*
2 Jones & Latouch, 422; Randall vs. Errngton; 10 Vesey, 427;
Crow vs. Ballard, 3 Brown's C. C., 104; Brook-man vs. R0thschild, 3 Simmons, 214; Exjarte Reynolds, 5 Vesey, 707. Besides,
the -rule is so just and consonant with .equity and -fair dealing, that
no jurist could hesitate to maintain and enforce it.

23
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Trusts are the peculiar 6ffipring and favorites of courts of equity,
and they have guarded them always with parental fidelity and care,
and with an unanimity of judicial decision rarely met with over
other subjects of their jurisdiction.
The fiduciary character -of trustees, guardians, executors and
agents, always impressed upon the performance of the duties they
imposed, a sacredness which has been, and will be, preserved from
the slightest attempts on their part to impair or violate the obligations they create.
Indeed, the courts hesitate not to visit with condign penalties, all
violations of the sacred duty of a trustee whose authority alone rests
upon the confidential character of his office; he is, whether created
by judicial order or private contract, regarded as acting solely and
only for his cestui qua trust, and cannot, directly or indirectly for
his own benefit, though proceeding fairly and openly, disregard the
duties, or disappoint the objects for which he was appointed.
By the ivil and French law, as promulgated by Domat, and
other eminent authors, the "fidei-commisses" and purposes of a
trust are made paramount to all other considerations.
Trust and faith are, therefore, the solid pillars on which courts
of chancery have rested their large and beneficent jurisprudence, so
that wrongs, which, by the connon and statute law, could not be
redressed, will be remedied, and what men in good conscience and
fair dealing ought todo, will. be decreed to be performed, and the
injured party restored to his rights, or compensated for their viola-

tion.
Indeed, the books are full of cases where the law, srict/ administered, is insufficient to reach the remedy, and restore the losses
which breachies of trust have occasioned.
But, through the instrumentality of its writ of injunction, a court
of chancery can alone arrest impending ruin, and save the injured
and outraged party, before the thunderbolt has descended and
brought on him irremediable ruin.
Chancery courts give effect to the intentions of parties to a contract, so as to produce and carry out the true object of it. (See
Jeremy's Equity, page 486.) Without this power, social rights, laws
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based upon liberty, and liberty regulated by laws, would be.a mere
mockery; and result often in the grossest injustice, if the rights of
persons and property were left alone to the strict and inexorable
rules of the common and statute laws-to illustrate by a common
case: when a bill of exchange, about to be negotiated fraudulently
and without consideration, is offered, equity will compel the holder
to deliver it up to'be cancelled, and in all cases contracts, though
the construction of them is- the same in equity and at law, yet a
court of Chancery, looking at the intent, will apply the remedy.
(See 2d Vesey, page 445.)
So the rights of married women, a dependent and confiding class,
"are protected against -their husband's acts and obligations, and
a cherished patrimony is rescued from the insatiate jaws of creditors, whose. tyranny too often inflicts a slavery more galling 'and
tcrushing than the -chains of despotism; and the affections and
wishes of domestio life and parental solicitude are, by the hand-of
equity, in the constructiod of wills and testaments, realized and pro"
*served to children aiid descendants, unimpaired.
- qaity, thereforeas-established, expounded and administered in
England and this country, has become the sahctua'y and. guardiaa
of human trusts, confidences and intentions; which, preserved and
enforced, revive into foliage and fruit the' cold and arid fields; over
which strict common and statute law, and their.rigid rules -of interpretation and decisions, had for centuries presided.
But it is not my purpose to dwell longerton this grateful-viewof
the present results of- equity jurisprudence, -and they are only now
invoked to honor and.defend the great principles established by-it,
and the great jurists who have administered it.
I
.-. t
Many of the modern rules of law are now derived from chancery
adjudications.....-Presumptions, as against stale debts and demands, and the
principles covering the large and all embracing action of assumpit,
trace their origin to this just fountain.
With these reflections which have occurred to me, and in the light
of'former and late decisions, so innumerable, to some of which I
shall refer, I could not hesitate to pronounce the sale in question to
-
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be a violation of a trust, and in this case to declare it null and
void, upon the conceded facts and evidence to which I have referred in this record; which, in a word, are, that Whittington, the
defendant here, was the trustee of the complainant, Montgomery,
under the contract and stipulations of their agreement and- contract
-he offered the trust property confided to him first for sale on the
15th of February, in direct opposition to the terms of this contract;
he .then, co-operating and conspiring -with Hooper who held the
other moiety of the "Jewess" under an absolute bill of sale from
Murphy, permitted himself to be bound in the penalty of $1,000, to
sell her at all hazards, and at any sacrifice, on the 1st of March,
the earliest- day after the 28th of February, the time before which"
it was agreed she was not to be sold, (except at private sale) after
an advertisement which departed from the terms of sale prescribed
or omitted to publish them, and at the sale of the 1st of March,
having previouslyadvanced, or agreed to advance $10,000 to his
partner Ricketts, permitted him to purchase the steamer at a low
price, the bid, as Matthews the auctioneer, states, being entered to the firm of Ricketts & Whittington on his book, though this is
afterwards sought to be explained.
His firm, Ricketts & Whittington, made on the 2d'of March, the
first payment by their check on this account, and within thirty days,
the defendant, Whittington, proclaimed himself a part owner with
Hooper, in the Custom House document, (the bill of -sale from
Hooper & Whittington to Ricketts & Whittington,) and then by
the same instrument took the title and possession of the "Jewess"
by a conveyance from Hooper and him.e4 to Ricketts and himself,
upon the identical consideration, to wit, $12,500, which Ricketts
gave for her on the 1st of Marcl, thus not only violating his trust,
but becoming vendor and vendee in the transaction. Ie has there
abandoned the interests of his €eetui que trust, and stands on this
record disclosed in his true character.
Could human language or actions convey more irresistibly the
conclusion, that he did, iadirecyj through his partner, Ricketts,
bid for the steamer, and then directly assumed the right over the
steamer as the owner of one undivided half of her?
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Here I might rest the c.ase, with an appeal even to the defendant
himself, certainly to his counsel, to show from this record, any
other conclusion than that to which I have come. Overwhelmed
by these facts, they have, however, ingeniously assumed that he
did not himself bid, and that afterwards, though a trustee (and
the trust uhexecuted,) he was not wrong in taking an interest in the
steamer.
This is ingenious, but, with great respect, it is unsound, and no
authority has been cited to sustain such a proposition. See the
cases of Davoue vs.' anning, 2 Johns. 257, and Hart vs. Ten Eyji,
2 Johns. 115.
But against the clear application of the safe and conservative rule
which I have advanced, and by which this case must stand or fall.
The defendant's counsel have referred to one English (Campbell
vs., W4rlker, 5 Vesey, 679) and two American cases, which they
say authorize the purchase by a trustee of the trust property, that
of Prevost .vs. Gratz, 1 Peters, 365, 378; and Fisk vs. Sarber, 6
Watts & Sargent, 18.
. It is conceded that a trustee may purchase by consent of a Court
of Chancery, or when he is disconnected with the trust and there is
a distinct and clear contract, ascertained to be such after -a jealous
and scrupulous -examination of the circumstances that the ceetui
que trust intended tihit the trustee should buy, that there is no
fraud, or concealment. Michoud vs. Girod, 4 Howard, 552. But
before and since the great leading English case, decided by the
House of Lords, of the York Buildings Company vs. HcKenzie, 2
Bro. P. Cases, down to the case in 4 Howard, decided by the highest
tribunal in this country, there is no variableness or'shadow of turning in the judgments of all the chancellors and judges who have
affirmed and enforced the great and conservative rule which now
avoids this*sale.
I have perhaps gone more in detail on this question than the case
required, but in giving my opinion, I desired to state. fully the
authorities and grounds on which it rests, and to justify my own
conviction of its soundness and justice. If, however, any doubt
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could now exist, the decisions of our own.State have closed the door
forever to all doubt and cavil-so that this doctrine of Thurlow and
Hardwicke, of Johnson, Kent and Marshall, now stands impregnable from.- all assaults, and our Court of Appeals, following, as it
was bound to do, the broad current of these high English and
American authorities, have re-asserted and affirmed it; who say,
that it is well settled that a trustee cannot purchase for himself, at
his. own sale, directly or indirectly; the policy of the law forbids it,
and if he does, the sale will be set aside on the application of the
parties interested, or if he sells and becomes himseY interested in
the purchase, the cestui que trust is entitled as of course, to come
in and set aside that purchase, without showing even actualinjury.
See Simpson vs. Davisi 5 Harris & Johnson, 148; William' -zeecutors vs. Marshall, 4 Gill & J. 379 ; Mason vs. Martin & Kemp,
4 Maryland Reports, 133 ; Bichardsonvs. Jones, 3 Gill & J. 184;
Bell vs. Webb & Hong, 2 Gill, 169; Dorsey vs. Dorsey, 3 Harris
& J. 151; Cross vs. Cohen, 3 Gill, 257;- hfnggold vs. Binggold,
1 Harris & Gill, 70. And-I now dismiss this question as definitely
settled in Maryland. The respondent's counsel have argued that
the sale is voidable and not void; be it so, it is- good only till the
cestui quw trust, "as of course," assails it, and his acquiescence
or consent in the sale must be with a full knowledge of all the circumstances.
Thip record shows no acquiescence or approval by Montgomery,
for we find him, on the day after the sale, the 2d of March, notifying the defendant Whittington not to make a title, or in any manner
part with the steamer, and in April filing his bill to vacate the
same, having previously, on the 15th of February, by his remonstrances, compelled a withdrawal of the steamer, and arrested the
sale then. Something has been said of Montgomery's assent to the
sale of the 15th of February, and his leaving the draft of an advertisement at the counting-room of Whittington & Ricketts for this
purpose; but after a careful examination of the testimony in the
case on this subject, I can find nothing to show, in the language of
the authorities, (see Davoue Ys. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 257,

MONTGOMERY vs. WHITTINGTON ET AL.

and Michoud vs. airod, 4 Howard, 552,) such an approval and
acquiescence, fully and without reserve, or such a delay or laches,
in repudiating the conduct or acts of the trustee, as a court of equity
would consider an adoption by the cestui que trust of those acts, and
a confirmation of the sale.
Even the testimony of Hooper, (one of the parties) is inconclusive
as to this point.. On his examination, at page 37 of the printed
record, he says: "Montgomery furnished witness with a paper
drawn up in such colors, to advertise the sale of the steamer, painting
her so highly, that witness declined advertising her on those terms;
but witness took a part of Montgomery's proposed advertisement,
and with his own additions to it, advertised the vessel. He does
not think any date was namedfor the sale in Montgomery's advertisement; does not know what became of said paper; has caused a
search to be.made for it."
It is.referred to also by Laws, (another witness for the defence,)
as made out by Montgomery and left at their counting rooms.
But Mr. Williams, acting as Solicitor for Montgomery, distinctly.
and emphatically contradicts any inference to be drawn, that
Montgomery agreed to such a sale on the 15th of February, by
stating that on the 14th of February he received a telegraphic
dispatch from Montgomery, then in New York, requesting him
.to have the sale put off; that he Montgomery would be on in the
night train, thai he reached Baltimore on the morning of the said
sale, that he went with Montgomery to the Exchange, -and there
forbid the sale, telling Whittington that he could not make the
sale on that day; that it was "in the. teeth of his agreement,"
that Hooper and Whittington united to persuade him to use his
influence with Montgomery to allow the sale to proceed; that they
represented to him that there were many strangers about the stand,
and that it might be advantageous to a future sale to let the steamer
be.put up, and that they thought a good sale could be effected of
the vessel; that he did all he could in the way of argument and
personal influence with Montgomery to induce him to agree' to a
sale then, but he (Montgomery) resolutely refused; and that neither
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Hooper nor Whittington then made any pretence that Montgomery
had ever assented to the sale on the 16th of February.
But .the fact of his preparing a notice or advertisement of the
Jewess, b.eing a part owner, interested, and better acquainted with
her value and capabilities, is not, as argued, inconsistent with his
conduct and course throughout. He was desirous that his trustee,
Whittington, should proceed on the most favorable grounds to
execute the trust, and present to the public ihe steamer in the most
favorable light, to insure a full attendance at the sale, and the best
possible price for her. So that nowhere can I discover in this
record, either before the sale attempted on the 15th of February,
or the one made on the 1st of M arch, any sufficient evidence to
justify the belief that the complainant Montgomery, ever authorized,
acquiesced in, or approved, either the one or the other, in the terms
and in the manner they were made; he stood then as he now stands,
by the stipulations- and trusts of the agreement made and executed
between the defendant Whittington and himself, and so I shall
adjudge and decree. I can, therefore, find nothing iu this record,
from the testimony of the defendant's most favorable witnesses,
which, in my judgment, shows such an approval or adoption of this
sale, on Montgomery's part, as can take this case out of the great
and equitable rule I have adopted. And without imputing to this
defendant, or any of them, the original purpose to commit actual.
fraud by this extraordinary sale, and the combination of- Whittington, and Hooper,, and Ricketts to effect it, yet it amounts in law
and in equity to a fraud on the -rights and property of the complainant.
And although (which is not this case) if the course pursued by
the trustee had been regular and correct, and the price obtained at
the sale fair-and adequate, still this trustee could not become directly
interested in the purchase.
Having now disposed of the controlling question iii this case, the
only remaining inquiry is, what compensation or damages shall be
awarded to this complainant, and by what measure must they be
estimated and fixed. The complainant is entitled upon every principle of equity to the true value of the steamer at the time of the sale
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by Whittington & Ricketts to Wright; the vessel has been sold by
the defendants and carried beyond the jurisdiction of this court, and
there is no possible way by which this court can re-instate this complainant inJis interest, but by charging the trustee with the value
of the property in the way of compensation or damages.
This sale has been made by Ricketts & Whittington since* the
filing of this bill, in May, 1854, and: the record shows that the
"Jewess," having passed into other hands, has been lost at sea, so
that no re-sale can be decreed, and her value in the form of damages
must now be the subject of such a decree, as equity and justice may
require.
The record is full of estimates and values, placed by witnesses on
this steamer, at different times, and her character as a sea-worthy
vessel has been 'alternately assailed or maintained by the opinions
of many witnesses on both sides.
Montgomery and Murphy are said to have given and expended
over $20,000 for her in the original purchase and repairs.
Messrs. Olackner, Reeder, Dean,.Kane, Peters, Morris, Morrison
and others, witnesses for complainint, speak of different valuations
put on her by themselves and others, and some of them refer to
conversations with Ricketts, Whittington and Hooper, in which they
regarded her as worth various amounts, but none so low as the sum
for which she sold on the 1st of March, except it is to be found in
a letter to Everetts and Brown from Hooper, in which he rates her
as not being worth more than $10,500,'and in his testimony in this
case he says that $12,000 was the full value of the steamer, and
more than she was worth; although but a short time before 1st of
March, 1854, ,Hooper had estimated her value at $20,000, having
on this basis agreed to allow Montgomery to purchase .Murphy's
half at $10,000, as shown by his own testimony in this record.
On the other hand (both sides indeed proving too much) Messrs.
Leffler, Beachman, Robb, Hooper and others, including a Mr. Jury,
differ widely from the complainant's witnesses, and think, as a sea
vessel, the "Jewess" was not very valuable. Jury, in fact, says
this steamer was as unfit for sea as "a rotten pumpkin," (to use his
own language) "such - vessel, to be sure, might go to sea and per-
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form a voyage in safety if the weather were fair; t1hatmight happen
to a rotten pumpkin."
That she was of valie, notwithstanding Mr. Jury's opinion, and
estimated as a good steamer for some purposes all otters admit;
but amid the conflict of the evidence (being opinions) on this subject,
whether given by experts or non-experts, and much of the testimony
on both sides is of such a character, tinged besides, with feeling,
natural, perhaps, to the vanity of pre-conceived or expressed opinions,
and by the prejudices of witnesses; and upon this sea of the evervarying and changing waves of opinions, as to the value of the
steamer "Jewess," the court must find, as best it can, some anchorage, a~nd that can only be done in safety and justice, by turning
to the ground where the defendants Whittington, Hooper and Ricketts rested and formed their own judgment of her value.
Hooper had already regarded her, byhis agreement with Montgomery, as worth- $20,000.
And Peters, a witness, states, that Ricketts or Wittington offered
her to him for $20,000 a few days after the first of March. And
in fact it is in proof that she .*as withdrawn on the 15th of February, after a bid of $27,500 by Mr. Peters, in good faith, and
Montgomery then limited her, if sold on that day, to $35,000; be
this as it may, I might find great difficulty in coming to a just conclusion of the measure of value in this case, but for the estimate
and valuation, Whittington, the defendant, and his partner, Ricketts,
have in the most solemn form, placed on this steamer, which is
found in the testimony of D. 0. Laws, their clerk, who says, he
knows of the sale by Ricketts & Whittington, of the "Jewess," to
J. J. Wright, of New York; the amount realized from this sale by
them is $9,000 ; there is a balance remaining unpaid of $21,000,
with interest, cnsisting of drafts, &c., which he names.
The defendants, Ricketts and Whittington, have therefore, by
this sale to Wright, made in May, 1854, placed an estimate and
value upon the "1Jewess" by which they must now abide.
The opinions of' witnesses varying from $20,000 to $80,000 in
the record can give no safe measure of value ; but the well considered
and deliberate estimate of Whittington & Ricketts, as owners of the
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steamer, expressed in their sale to Wright, is the only just and
proper standard by which a court of equity can ascertain, with
justice to all parties, the true measure of value and damages in this
case. It is the judgment of the defendants themselves, and I shall
adopt and enforce it.
Although, as Chancellor Johnson well says, in 2 Chan. Rep. 108,
"the rule of law and equity is strict and severe in such cases, and
if damages are sustained, they are given to the utmost value that
the article is Worth or will bring." See also 15 Vesey, 439, the
cases of Lupton vs. V 7 ite; Amory vs. De Lamaire, 1 Strange, 505;
.Denton vs. Stewart, 1 Cox, Oh. R., 258; Hart vs. Ten Ec'k, 2
Johns. 115; Binggold vs. 1inggold, 1 Harris & Gill, (Maryland
Reports) 70; all of these cases go to the extent that the cetui que
trust is entitled to thefull value of the property at the time of sale
by the trustee.
In the application of these principles, .I shall take the time of the
sale to J. J. Wright, as the period at which to estimate the value of
the Jewess, and decree that the defendant Whittington, shall pay
one half of the sum of $30,000, being the value, and true value,
which he then ilaced upon the vessel himself, and for which sum,
he and his partner, Ricketts, sold her, and to the payment of which
sum they received $9,000 cash, and notes and mortgages from the
vendee, Wright, amounting to the sum of $30,000 in all.
But it has been assumed that this sale to Wright, was speculative
and on paper merely, and should not be a guide as to the true value
of the vessel; but there is nothing in this record to sustain such a
view. The defendants regarded it as a real sale, and supposed that
all the parties were perfectly good, and cannot novi be permitted to
repudiate their own acts or i*mpeach the correctness of their own
judgments as to the value of the "Jewess."
I will sign a decree in the case, fixing the value of the steamer,
when disposed of by the defendants Whittington & Ricketts, at
thirty thousand dollars, and direct the auditor to adjust and settle
an account in the case, allowing the defendant credit for one half
of such bills for such repairs made on the steamer as were necessary
and indispensable, after charging him with one half of any materials,

31ERRIHEW vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

such as old copper, &c., taken off or from said steamer Jewess, and
also allowing him for the payment of one half of any just debts
which may have been paid by him, and which had been incurred
for and on account of the said steamer "Jewess" by Montgomery,
previous to the conveyance to Whittington, on the 9th of January,
1854.

In the Circuit Court of Wisconsin,-May Term, 1854.
MERRIHEW vs. THE MILWAUKEE AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD COMPANY.
1. The Board of Directors of a railroad company may make rules and regulations
in relation to their business, but they must be reasonable, lawful, and within the
limits of their charter.

The establishment of. certain trains for the exclusive
transportation of passengers and their baggage, and other trains exclusively for
the-carrying of freight, is a reasonable regulation.
2. A person cannot, by merely paying his fare and procuring his ticket, as a passenger, compel a railroad company to carry him daily, together with his trunk or
trunks, when such trunk or trunks contain merchandise, money and other valuable.matter known as "1express matter."

'The charge of the court was delivered by
J.-This action is brought to recover damages for the
alleged wrongful acts of the defendants, the Milwaukee and Mississippi Railroad Company.
Railroads are of modern date, and novel questions are constantly
arising between them and individuals, which require the considera-.
tion of courts and juries. This is the first time any of the questions
involved in this case have been presented to this court. It will be
my duty to give you the law relative to them, to the best of my
ability.
The plaintiff complains of two wrongful acts, First, That he had
a paper called a pass, signed by Jno. Catlin, President of the company, and that he had presented this pass to the conductor on the
train and was refused a passage upon it.
Second. That he offered to go on board of the cars at Milwaukee
for the purpose of being carried west on the road, and tendered the
HUBBELL,
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usual ticket for his fare, and was not allowed to go. These facts
sufficiently appear from the evidence and the admission of the parties.
The defendants contend that they were justified in these refusals,
under the circumstances of the case.
And, 1st. The defendants alledge that the pass was revoked, or
re-called by the company, and that the company rightfully refused
to carry the plaintiff upon it.
On this point, I have to say to you that the instrument itself
carries no evidence of a consideration paid. It is a mere license to
pass, or a naked undertaking, without consideration expressed, to
carry the plaintiff. It was good until it was revoked, and no longer.
If, while the defendants were carrying the plaintiff under this pass,
they had injured him, or his baggage, by carelessness, they would
have been liable for any damage proved. And if the plaintiff, relying upon the expectation or belief that the pass would not be
revoked, had placed himself in a situation where its revocation
caused him an injury, it may be that, on proof of such special injury, damages might be recovered. But the revocation was within
the power of the company, and was not, in itself, a wrongful act,
but would only become so from the manner of doing it, which must
be proved. Unless, therefore, you find by the evidence, that some
consideration was paid for the pass, or that some passed or existed
between the parties, you will find that the plaintiff cannot re cover
upon the ground of its revocation, since there is no proof of special
damage. As to the right to revoke it-it appears that Mr. Brodhead was Superintendent of the company, and had authority to revoke it, and ordered it revoked before the passage was refused by
the conductors. This might be regarded as sufficient authority for
that purpose. But it appears that the conductors were officers and
agents of the company, acting as such, and the defendants here
have adopted and sanctioned their act. In the absence of proof.
that their act was unauthorized at the time, this is conclusive of the
•
authority of the conductors.
Second. The defendants contend that they rightfully refused to
carry the plaintiff, when he offered to go, on his ticket. It is ad-
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mitted that the ticket was evidence of payment 'f the proper fare
of a passenger. This point involves several important considerations.
The defendants were doing the business of common carriers of
freight and passengers on the line of their road. As such, they
were subject to the laws regulating common carriers. As a corporation they were not subject to greater liabilities, nor entitled to
greater privileges, than private companies engaged in the same employment. As a corporate body they were entitled to do only those
things which their charter authorized, and they could not lawfully
do any thing prohibited by their charter. As common carriers they
were bound to carry all freight and all passengers which were presented for transportation and paid for ; or to show some good cause
or reason for not conveying them. But for their own convenience
and safety, and for the convenience and safety of the public, they
were entitled to establish rules and regulations for the management
of their business. These rules and regulations have no limits, except that they must be reasonable, lawful and within the liiits of
the charter. And these regulations might be adopted by the Board
of Directors, in the form of by-laws or resolutions, under their corporate seal, or by any officer or agent having charge of any particular branch of their business, in relation to the business committed
to his charge. In this manner, the company or its officers might
regulate the number of trains to be run daily, the time of departure, the rate Qf speed, the quantity and kind of loading for each
car, the mode and time of receiving freight, giving receipts, issuing
tickets, taking fare, &c., &c. And they might, in like manner,
establish trains exclusively for passengers, and exclusively for
freight; or mix and divide them as they saw fit. The public, all
the while, might require a reasonable and proper regard for the
safety and convenience of all those having business to do With the
company. In the present case, the defendants allege that they had
established a train for carrying passengers, with their baggage exclusively, and that they had also established a train or trains for the
carrying of freight; and had presented reasonable accommodations to
the public in both cases. If they furnished reasonable and proper
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facilities to the public, for transporting freight and passengers, it
was not a legal ground of complaint that they carried one or more
passengers free of charge, as a compliment or favor. If, for instance, the passenger train contained sufficient and proper cars for
those passengers who paid, the company had a right'to run extra
cars and to run them empty, or to load them as they saw fit. They
might permit, if they so pleased, a shoemaker to occupy one, a
tailor another and a grocery dealer another, and still the only
question would be-is this allowed by the charter, and is there still
reasonable and proper accommodation for all the passengers who
have paid ?
The defendants might, in the same way, as a gratuity, or for pay,
allow the United States mails to be carried in the passenger train;
or they might authorize the carrying of express matter in such
train, by Holton & Eddy, or Flanders & Co., or any one else. The
question would still be-have they provided reasonable and proper
means for transporting freight and passengers generally? Unles!it is the legal right of all persons to have their freight conveyed by
the pa88enger train, there is .no ground of action because a particucular individual is allowed to put his freight on that train ; no more
than there would be on the part of passengers who had paid fare,
because one or more had been suffered to pass without pay.
In the present case, if you find that the company contracted with
Holton & Eddy to carry their express matter by the passenger
train, and if you still find that the company had made reasonable
and proper provision for carrying freight generally, the contract
with Holton & Eddy was lawful and proper, and neither the plaintiff, nor any one else, had a right to interfere with this business.
Now, the defendants allege that they had made this contract, and
that they excluded the freight of others from that train ; and that
the plaintiff had been engaged interfering with this lawful business
of theirs, and in attempts to get his freight on the passenger train,
contrary to their established rules ; and they allege further, that,
at the time he offered to go on the cars and presented his ticket, he
was engaged in such business, or that they had good reason to believe he was.
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If these several facts, or steps in the defence are proved, then the
refusal by the conductor was proper. But the defendants have the
burden of establishing these several facts to make out their case. It
is proved that the plaintiff had paid his fare and presented himself,
at the starting of the train, to go out as a passenger. They were
bound to carry him, or show a good cause for refusing. If you find
that the plaintiff was endeavoring to violate the reasonable and
proper rules of the company and to interfere with their lawful business, and was going out for that purpose, or that the agents of the
company had good reason to believe he was going out for that purpose, they were not bound to carry him, and he cannot maintain
this action for the refusal. He should have disclaimed his purpose to go on the express business, or to interfere with the lawful
business of the company.
The charter of this company has been granted by the legislature,
for a double purpose; first to establish a railroad, and accommodate
the public by the facilities it affords for the transportation of persons and property; Second, To induce and enable the company, by
the profits of their business, to make.a good road and conduct it
efficiently and properly. The benefit is mutual and reciprocal.
The company are bound reasonably to accommodate the public; and
otherwise may do all acts authorized by their charter for their own
benefit and in their own way.
New York Common Pleas,---JanuaryTerm, 1857.
JAMES M. LEWIS vs. JOHN A. GRAHAM AND OTHERS.
1. The distinction between a pledge and a mortgage. Where B had given G, the defendant, certain promissory notes and at the same time delivered to him sundry
certificates of Illinois State indebtedness, and made an agreement that if the
notes were unpaid at maturity, the defendants were authorized to dispose of and
sell the same sixty days after the maturity of the notes and apply the proceeds
to the credit of B, held, that this was a pledge and not a mortgage.
2. That on forfeiture for non-payment of the notes, the pledgees were required to
demand payment and give notice of the intended sale, before sale of the securities could le made by them, so as to deprive the pledgor of his right to redeem.
3. That demand and notice would apply only to such securities pledged as were specially set forth in such demand, and that a sale of any pledges without notice

would be invalid.
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4. That a special partner may, under the law in New York, purchase securities which
are sold by his partners as pledges forfeited for non-payment of notes heldby the
firm.
5. An offer to pay notes without any actual tenderof the money is sufficient, if such
tender would be useless by reason of the defendants' having previously sold the
securities.

-. P. Tesenden, plaintiff's attorney.

B. W. Bonney, counsel.

Mott & Murray, defendants' attorneys.

S. A. Foote, counsel.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
J.-The plaintiff has brought this action against the
defendants, who are members of a limited partnership, to obtain an
account claiming a right to redeem certain securities left by Nathl.
J. Brown, the assignor of the plaintiff, with the defendants, to secure
the payment of two notes of Brown, held by the defendants.
In August, 1844, the defendants were in partnership, Varnum
being the special partner, and the other defendants general partners. At that tifhe, one Brown, of Illinois, for a good consideration, gave to the defendants' firm his two promissory notes for
62,736 37, payable twelve months after date.
Brown delivered at the same time, as collateral security for the
said two notes, sundry certificates of Illinois State indebtedness,
some drawing interest, and some without any interest specified
therein, amounting to $8,500.
Afterwards, in 1846, Brown delivered to the defendants, as further security for the said notes, eight other certificates of Illinois
indebtedness, each for $132 50,'payable,. with interest, at a future day.
The agreement under which these notes were given, with the
securities, was in writing. By it, Brown agreed that if the notes
were not paid at the expiration of twelve months, the securities or
collaterals were to be under the control of the defendants' firm, and
said'firm was authorized to dispose of and sell said securities after
sixty days from the maturity of the notes, and apply the proceeds
thereof to the credit of Brown.
24
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The collaterals were to be sold at the highest market value in
New York; and the firm was only authorized to sell so much of the
collaterals as would pay off and discharge the indebtedness of
Brown; Brown's notes remained unpaid at maturity, excepting as
to $200, which was paid on one of the notes when it fell due. The
defendants' firm repeatedly demanded payment of Brown, prior to
18th of January, 1848, by letters through the mail, which were received by Brown, and on 18th January, 1848, they sent Brown a
letter, which was received by him in Illinois, demanding payment,
and enclosing a notice that all the securities held by them as collateral, and delivered when the notes were passed to Brown, would
be sold on the 21st of February, to pay indebtedness of Brown on
his notes to them. This notice did not include the eight certificates
delivered in 1846, as they were not mentioned therein. An answer
was received to this letter, dated 2d February, acknowledging that
such letter came to hand that day, suggesting modes of settlement,
and asking a further delay of sixty days.
On the 21st of February the securities were all sold at auction,
including those delivered in 1846, for a sum less than the amount
due to the defendants, and were purchased by tt* special partner,
Yarnum, on his own acccount.
On the 21st of February, 1848, the defendants wrote Brown a
letter, informing him of the sale, and enclosing an account showing a
balance due from Brown of $1,261, the payment of which was
claimed by them. In January, 1854, Brown offered to the defendant, Yarnum, in writing, to pay off the amount of the notes
and interest, and demanded the delivery to him of the collaterals
held by him, and credit for the money paid on them, which was refused.
On 21st January, 1854, Brown assigned his claims to the plaintiff for all the securities so pledged by him, in trust, to collect the
same, and out of the proceeds to pay the expenses and two and
a-half per cent. commissions ; then to pay to Hayes & Hyer, certain
indebtedness of Brown to them ; and lastly, to pay over the proceeds to Brown or his legal representatives.
This action was commenced by the assignee on the 18th February, 1854.
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An objection is taken by the defence that sufficient parties are
not before the court, because the cestui qui trust, under the assignment of Brown, are not named as plaintiffs. Before the code,
there was no necessity for joining them in such an action. The assignee bad full power to collect such claims in his own name. By
the 111th section of the Code of Procedure every action is to be
brought in the name of the real party in interest; but by section
113, an exception is made in favor of a trustee of an express trust,
and some other cases, in which an action may be maintained by the
trustee without joining with him the person for whose benefit the
action is prosecuted.
The subsequent, clause of.1851 was not intended to limit the
meaning of the term trustee of an express trust to the case therein
mentioned, but to extend it so that it should include a person with
whom the contract is made for the benefit of another. I think
there can be no doubt as to the right of the plaintiff to maintain the
action in his'own name, without joining cestuis que trust as parties.
. Even if it were necessary, however, the defendants cannot now
make the objection. By section 144, defect of parties may be objected to by the demurrer, and by section, 147, in the answer i0P
certain cases. If no such objection is taken either by demurrer or
answer, the defendant is deemed to have waived the same. As no
such objection is properly made in the answer, it cannot now be
made available by the defendants.
The first question that arises in an examination of this case upon
the merits is, whether the agreement by which these securities were
placed in the defendants' possession is to be regarded as a mortgage, or merely pledging the property by way of security. The
counsel claims that this agreement is in fact a mortgage, and that.
as such, the holders had a right to sell the securities forthwith on
forfeiture by non-payment.
The distinction stated in Brownell agt. Hawkins, 4 Barber S. C.
491, is urged in the- defendants" favor. A mortgage is a sale of
goods, with the condition that if the mortgagor pays, it shall be
void. A pledge contains no words of sale, but an authority, if
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the debt is not paid, to sell the pledge for that purpose. In the one
case, the title passes to the mortgagee, in the other the title remains in the pledgor, although possession is given to the pledgee.
Recognizing the distinction as correct, still there is nothing in this
agreement that will warrant the conclusion that the assignor intended at the time of execution to convey to the defendants' firm
his title to the property pledged. On the contrary, the whole tenor
of the instrument shows, I think, conclusively, that his intent was
merely to pledge the property as security.
He says therein: "As security for the payment of the notes, I
have deposited with them the securities, &c." The defendants'
control over the securities was only to be in case of failure to pay
the notes for which they were pledged, and then they were only to
be sold at the highest market price, and in any event the defendants
could only sell enough of the securities to pay the debt of Brown.
These provisions ire entirely inconsistent with the necessary requisites of a mortgage, in which it is necessary that the title should
pass at the time of execution of the mortgage, and by which, if failure to pay at maturity happens, .the right of redemption ceases, and
the title becomes absolute, subject to relief in a court of equity.
'Prown agt. Beanart and al, 8 Johns. Rep. 96; Ackley agt. Finch,
7 Cowen, 299 ; Brownell agt. Hawkins, 4 Barb. S. 0. 491.
The clause giving the defendants control of the property, after
failure to pay, gives no other or further right than a pledgee has on
failure of the pledgor to redeem the pledge. The pledgee has possession, and he thereby obtains the control of the property, so as to
proceed according to law and sell the pledge to obtain payment of
the debt for which it was pledged. But in case of an ordinary
pledge, and to this case by express agreement, he can only sell
enough to discharge the debt, and cannot claim a forfeiture of the
whole property, as he could under a mortgage. The proper construction of the contract between these parties is to consider it a
pledge merely, and not a mortgage. Dykers agt. Alstyn, 7 Mill,
497.
I have treated this question on the supposition that the distinction above stated in 4 Barb. S. 0., was correct, although I am not
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prepared to admit it as broadly as there stated; and the case of Wilson
agt. Little, 2 Comst. 448, shows that actual title to the pledged property is not always sufficient to make the instrument pledging it a
mortgage. In that case the property (stock) was deposited as security for the money loaned, with authority to sell on non-payment of
the loan, and the stock was actually transferred to the pledgee.
There the same grounds were urged as in this, that the instrument
was a mortgage, and the property forfeited on non-payment; but
the court held, notwithstanding the title had passed to the pledgee,
that the instrument was not a mortgage, and that the property
pledged could only be sold after demand of payment. See 5 Johns.
258 ; 10 Johns. 471.
The next question in this case is, what acts are required from the
pledgee, after failure to pay the debt, before he can sell the pledge
for that purpose. The plaintiff contends that demand of payment
from the debtor, and notice of the time and place of such sale, must
be served before the sale can legally be made. That a demand of
payment; is necessary is sustained by all the authorities, Story on
Bailment, 348, 310 ; Wilson agt. Little, 2 Com. 443; Stearns agt.
MJarsh, 4 Denio, 227. The necessity of such demand was conceded
by the defendants' counsel upon the trial, and the counsel only differed upon the necessity of notice. In Stearns agt. .Marsh, 4
Duer, 227, Mr. Justice Jewett says: "As the law now is, the
pledgee may file a bill in chancery for a foreclosure and proceed to
ajudicial sale, or he may sell without judicial process, upon giving
reasonable notice to the pledgor to redeem and of the intended sale."
Again : Personal notice to the pledgor to redeem and of the intended sale, must be given, in order to authorize a sale by the act
of the party. Before giving such notice, the pledgee has no right
to sell the pledge, and if he do, the pledgor may recover the value
of it from him without tendering the debt."
The same rule is ailopted in Brown agt. Ward and al. 9 Howard,
497; 3 Duer, 660; Mr. Justice Hoffman holding that a right to
sell property that was pledged could only be exercised after the
delbt is due, upon a demand for payment and notice of the sale. 2
Kent. Com. 581; Story on Bailment, 208 ; Patchin agt. Peirce,
12 Wendell, 61; 4 Kent's Com. 139.
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I have not been able to find any case, and none was cited on the
argument, distinctly holding that a demand of the money due, without notice of the time and place of sale, was sufficient to protect the
pledgee in making the sale.'
In the case of Wilson agt. Little, supra, which was mainly relied
on by the defendants' counsel, it is said that the pawnee cannot sell
without a demand of payment previously.
But in that case it is nowhere said that a notice of the sale was
not necessary, and in the contract 6n which that action was brought,
notice of the sale was dispensed with. See also Tucker agt. Wilson, 1 P. Wins. 261 ; Lockwood agt. .Ewer, 2 Atk. 303; De Lisle
agt. Prestman, 1 Browne's Penn. R., 176.
A sale of the pledge was not valid, so as to protect the pledgee,
without a previous demand of payment and notice to the pledgorbefore the sale.
Was the demand and notice as proven in this case, sufficient ?
It is in the .proof that the pledgees repeatedly demanded payment
of the debt due, by letters which were received by Brown.On the 18th of January, 1848, a letter was sent to Brown, demanding payment, and giving notice of the sale of the stocks pledged
as stated in notice of sale enclosed, for the 21st February, next ensuing. This notice only referred to the stocks pledged at the time
of the original transaction, and did not include the eight certificates
of indebtedness subsequently pledged by Brown, as additional security in 1846.
So far as relaies to the property specified in the notice of sale, I
think there can be no doubt as to the sufficiency both of the demand
and notice. It was made thirty-four days before the sale, and was
sufficiently explicit in the demand, and also in the notice, that the
property would be sold at the time appointed. No objection is
taken to it on these grounds. But it is objected to the sufficiency
of this notice, that the time was too short, inasmuch as Brown was
at that time in Illinois ; and that it appears by Brown's letter in
answer to the notice, that it was not received by him until the 2d
February. I am not willing to give any such effect to the statement
in Brown's letter that the notice came to hand tliat day.
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Presumptively, the 'notice was sufficient.

If the plaintiff relied

on the distance of Brown from this city as an objection to the sufficiency of the notice, he should have shown, that the transmission by
mail was such as to deprive Brown of the benefit of the notice.
Until that is shown we have no right to presume that the course of the
mail was such as to prevent Brown from attending to the sale of the
property pledged. Even if it be taken for granted that the notice
was not received until the 2d February, it would not follow that he
had not ample time to come to New York after that time, and have
attended to the redemption of the property here.
Bt such notice cannot be made applicable to the eight certificates of $132 50 each, which were not included therein. Brown,
from the notice served upon him, had a right to conclude that the
defendants' firm (the pledgors) did not intend at that time to sell
anything except the property advertised in the notice. He knew
they could not properly sell at auction any of the property of
which they had not given previous notice. The subsequent notice
in the papers, for three days, of the intended sale of these certificates does not remedy the defect; Brown had no notice thereof,
and he was not bound thereby, and I see no ground on which the
omission of these certificates in the first notice can be remedied.
It is contended, however, by the plaintiff, that the sale was void,
inasmuch as the defendant, Varnum, was" the purchaser, he being
the special partner in the defendants' firm.
It must be considered that a purchase by the pledgee-or by one
of the pledgees, if there are more than one-does not alter the.right of
the pledgor; such a purchase does not terminate the bailment, but
leaves the purchaser the same responsibility to the pledgor as before
the sale. Story on Bailment, 819. The general rule was fully laid
down by the 'chancellor, in Torrey agt. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige,
649, 663, as a rule of universal application to all persons- coming
within its principle, that no party can be permitted to purchase an
interest where he has a duty to perform that is inconsistent with
the character of purchaser: See flawlel agt. Creamer,4 Cow,
736. This doctrine was not disputed by the defendants' counsel,
but he denied its applicability to the defendant rarnum, claiming
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that his relations as special partner to the other defendant was such
as to deprive him of the character of pledgee and of any right to
interfere with the pledge, and of course imposed on him no duty
towards the pledgor.
The property was pledged to the defendants' firm. The persons
then having a right to act in the management of the affairs of the
firm, were the bailees, and they only were charged with the duty of
selling, at the highest market price, the securities so pledged.
By the statute authorizing limited partnerships, the special partner is prohibited from transacting any business on account of the
partnership, nor can he be employed as agent, attorney or otherwise, and any interference contrary to these provisions renders him
liable as a general partner. Section 17.
There was no duty which Varnum could assume to discharge in
reference to the indebtedness of Brown to the firm without making
himself liable as a general partner. As the statute prohibited him
from acting, and as in fact he never assumed to act as partner, no
duty devolved upon him in reference to the bailment. He could
not direct or aid in the sale of the securities. An attempt to interfere with the sale of them, would have made him liable. A refusal
to do so did not involve him in any neglect of duty. If this be so,
and if, during the partnership, the special partner was not one of
the persons charged with the duty of controlling and preserving the
pledge, the subsequent dissolution of the partnership did not alter
his liability; the bailees were the persons originally constituted by
the act.of the pledgor, and no other could be substituted by the mere
fact that the partnership had been dissolved by its own limitation.
The special partner, it is true, may advise as to the interest of
the partnership, but so may any one else. Such advice is no act
or control of the partnership funds or duties, and does not in my
opinion alter the position of the defendant Yarnum. Although this
question is not free from difficulty, I am inclined to think the view
I have taken of it to be the correct one.
The remaining question is-What tender is necessary to entitle
the plaintiff to bring this action ?
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The tender made was contained in the letter of 18th January,
1854, addressed to the defendant Yarnum, stating that the defendants' firm had transferred to him the notes and securities, offering
to pay the two notes, and demanding the collaterals. If any had.
been paid off, the demand was varied accordingly.
The like demand is made upon the firm.
If I am right in my previous conclusions as to the validity of the
sale of the first security pledged by Brown, then it is evident that
no tender could have been made of the balance until that balance
had been ascertained, and if any portion of these securities, either
principal or interest, had been collecled, the like accounting would
be necessary-under either case the offer to pay was sufficient, and
as the firm had put it out of their power to comply with their duty,
in payment, by selling the certificates of indebtedness, it was not
necessary to make any further tender.
In Wilson agt. Little, 4 Comstock, 449, Mr. Jistice Ruggles
says, the sale by the defendant before payment demanded was,
therefore, wrongful. "The defendants having voluntarily put it out
of their power to restore the pledge, a. tender of the money borrowed would have been fruitless, and was, therefore, unnecessary.
The same rule is stated in Cortelyou agt. Lansing, 2 Caines' Cases
in Error, 200.
My conclusions, therefore, are-:
First. That the instrument under which these securities were
transferred to the defendants' firm, was a pledge, and not a mortgage ;
Second. That on forfeiture for non-payment of the notes, the
pledgees were required to demand payment and give notice of the
intended sale, before sale of the securities could be made by them,
so as to deprive the pledgor of his right to redeem ;
TUird. That the demand and notice as to all the securities
pledged, except the eight securities, pledged in 1846, was sufficient;
Yourtk. That no notice.was given of the sale of the eight certificates pledged in 1846, and-that such sale was invalid against- the
plaintiff and Brown.
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Fifth. That the special partner, Varnum, was not prohibited, by
his relation to the firm, from purchasing the securities at the time
of the sale by. the pledgees.
Sixth. That the offer of Brown to pay the notes was sufficient,
without an actual tender of the money, and that any tender was unnecessary, as the defendants' firm had, by the sale of the securities,
rendered such tender fruitless.
It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
directing an account of the moneys received on the securities which
were pledged in 1846, and in stating such account; the balance due
from the plaintiff on the loan must also be stated. As the complaint avers that such securities have been paid, and the same is
not denied in the answer, the only further provision necessary in
the judgment would be that the balance remaining unpaid by either
party to the other should be recovered, and such order will be reserved until the report of the referee on the accounting is brought
in.
Judgment for the plaintiff; that the defendants account, and reference ordered t? Michael Ulshoeffer, Esq., to take the account as
to the certificates pledged in 1846, and report to this court. Further directions are reserved until the coming in of the report.

In the Court of Common Pleas,PiladelphiaCounty.
TATHAM vs. THE WARDENS OF PHILADELPHIA.
1. It is settled that the writ of mandamus issues only where a ministerial act is to
be done, and there is no other specific remedy.

It is granted only at the discre-

tion of the court to whom application is made.
2. By the act of 1851, the Board of Wardens on application -of the owner of lands
on the Delaware, within the limits of Philadelphia, is bound to cause to be defined,
at the expense of the applicant, the line of low water mark bounding their jurisdiction, nor has this duty been affected by the Consolidation Act.
3. Windmill island, in the river Delaware, opposite the City of Philadelphia, is within the jurisdiction of the port wardens.
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The opinion" of the court was delivered by
ALLISON, J.-George N. Tatham presented his petition to this
court, prayingthat a writ of Mandamus be awarded, commanding
J. E. Harned and others, wardens of the port of Philadelphia to
cause to be defined upon the ground, at the expense of the applicant, the line of low water, bounding their jurisdiction of a certain
lot on Windmill island, two hundred and fifty feet in breadth or
front, east and west; bounded upon the line of low water mark by
the river Delaware; on the south by the land of David Warren, and
on the north by other land of the said Tatham.
The petition recites that the petitioner is the owner of the lot of
ground above described, and that he made application in writing to
the board of wardens, requesting them to cause said line of low
water mark to be defined, which application was refused, and that
on the first day of September last, he again applied to the board,
asking them to reconsider their rejection of the prayer of his petition ; and that this last communication was laid upon the table by
the respondents, and that they continue to refuse to define for him
the line bounding their jurisdiction upon the land mentioned in his
petition. A rule was granted upon the said wardens to show cause
why a writ of mandamus should not be awarded, as prayed for, and
upon the return of the rule an answer was put in, showing cause
why said rule should not be made absolute.
The first reason assigned is, that the remedy of the petitioner is
by appeal, and not by writ of mandamus. This defence, if well
taken, would be conclusive against the application ; for the writ,
not being a writ of right, is granted only at the discretion of the
court, to whom application is made for its allowance ; and this discretion is not exercised in favor of the applicant, unless some proper and lawful purpose be answered by the writ, 2 T. R. 385 ; 1
Cowen, 501, and then only where a ministerial act is to be done,
and there is no other specific r6medy, Commonwealth vs. Judges of
Piladelphia,3 Binney, 278; Griffith vs. Cochran, 5 Binney, 103.
There are various acts of assembly giving appeals to the Courts of
Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions from the decision, o" the
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wardens in specific cases, liut neither of them have iny application
to the case before us, unless as was argued, the 12th section of the act
of April 28th, 1851, determines that the remedy in this case is by
appeal, and therefore, not by mandamus. It says, that any person
aggrieved by any decision of the board of wardens may have an
appeal to the Court of Quarter Sessions or other courts, as provided
by laws heretofore existing.
It may be questioned whether the remedies, "provided by laws
heretofore existing," are not restricted to the specific cases mentioned in the several acts of assembly passed prior' to the act of
.April 28, 1851, but a decision of this point becomes unnecessary,
by reason of the conclusion at which we have arrived, that the refusal of the wardens to define the line of low water mark, as prayed
for -by the petitioner, is not a decision, or an act performed by them
which can be appealed from; but is simply a refusal to do or perform an act imposed upon them as a ministerial duty. The 7th section of the act of April 28th, 1851, requiring that the board of
wardens of the port of Philadelphia, on the application of the owner
of land bounded by the Delaware and Schuylkill rivers, within the
limits of the port, shall cause to be defined upon the ground, at the
expense of the applicant, the line of low water mark bounding their
jurisdiction. There is nothing here to be decided-no doubt to be
solved-no controversy as between themselves and the petitioner,
or litigant parties to be determined by them, and therefore nothing
from which an appeal will lie. The act to be done is simple and
specific; to definfe the line of low water mark, and so far from leaving it t.o the discretion or judgment of the wardens, the language of
the law is imperative, shall cause, &c. An appeal, therefore, is not
the proper remedy in this case.
The second reason assigned is, that the power given to the wardens, by the 7th section of the act of April 28th, 1851, has become
vested in the Councils of the City of Philadelphia. This conclusion is drawn mainly from the 28t section of the act of consolidation, but it is a conclusion not warranted, we think, by any thing
therein contained, for it provides that the wardens to be elected by
councils, together with the master warden, shall do and perform the
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duties which do now or may by law or ordinance hereafter, belong
to the port wardens. The line which by this section the councils
are required to fix, is the line beyond which no wharf or pier shall
be constructed into the tideway of the river, and has no reference
whatever to the line of low water mark, although it has been argued
that the latter is dependent upon the former, and this is the reason
assigned by the wardens for not defining the low water mark line
upon Windmill Island It is difficult to understand how the mere
fixing of a point or line, to govern the future extension of wharves,
can in any way affect the line of low water mark upon the land of
the petitioner. But if it could be made to appear that a certain
alteration of the wharf line, by councils, might have the effect anticipated by the respondents, it would be no sufficient answer to
the petition of the complainant to the wardens, because it is uncertain whether the present wharf line ever will be changed, and if
changed, its effects are at best problematical.
The right of the petitioner to build his wharf .to low water mark
is a settled, clear and unquestionable right, not dependent or contingent, but an existing, immediate right, which ,may be exercised
at any moment without permission from the board of wardens. But
as a heavy penalty is imposed upon any one who builds a wharf or
pier into the tideway, beyond the line bounding the jurisdiction of
the wardens, without first obtaining the authority of the board ; and
as the line is to soma extent an arbitrary line, bare at low, and
covered with water at high tide, the exact location of which is at
all times somewhat uncertain, and therefore subject to be disputed ;
the law very wisely says to the wardens, you shall define this line;
as upon you is imposed the duty of enforcing the penalty.incurred
by those who, without your authority, build beyond it. Before the
passage of the act of 1851, every owner of land, bounded- by the
rivers Delaware and Schuylkill, who undertook to wharf in, between
low water mark and the fast land, had to take upon-himself the risk
of an infringement upon the rights of the public; and an infringement of an inch was as fatal as the infringement of a foot, or an
hundred feet; an error that any one was liable to fall into, ignorantly, or even in spite of every precaution that could be taken to
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avoid such a mistake.

The law as it then stood conceded the right
to wharf in to a certain line, but had pointed out no way of ascertaining the true location of that line ; and yet it said, if you build
one hair's breadth beyond your proper limits, you shall pay 64,000,
and remove the structure from the tideway beyond low water mark.
To remedy this just cause of complaint, the act of 1851 was passed;
the 7th section of which remains in full force, unaltered, and unaffected by the act of 1854.
The third ground upon which the answer goes, denies the jurisdiction of the wardens over Windmill Island.
The act of September 22, 1786, 2 Smith's Laws, 388, declares
that the island shall be a part of Philadelphia, and by the 1st section of the act of consolidation, Windmill Island is made a portion
of the fifth ward of the City of Philadelphia. By the 13th section
of the act of the 29th March, 1803, it is provided that when any
person shall be degirous to extend any wharf or other building of
the nature of a wharf, in the tide way of the Delaware, from any
part of the city or liberties of Philadelphia, *they shall make application, &c. Windmill Island being a part of the city, and having
been for seventeen years prior to the passage of the act of 1803,
establishing the board of wardens, it is very plain that the island in
question is as much under their jurisdiction, as is the western shore of
the Delaware, in front of the city and liberties of Philadelphia ; and
the reason for bringing the island into subjection to the wardens,
for the purposes covered by the act, is most obvious; for one of the
most important objects to be accomplished by the passage of the
law was the protection of the Delaware river front, and the establishment-of a proper system of wharfage, as essential to the prosperity of the city; but this would all be to little purpose if the
owners of the island could, by the extension of wharves from its
western shore, obstruct the channel between the island and the city
front to as great an extent as they might deem advisable.
But the 1st section of the act of Feb. 7, 1818, which is substantially a re-enactment of the 13th section of the act of 1803, is conclusive upon this point. It provides that all applications for the
extension of wharves into the tide way of the Delaware river from
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any part of the city, the Northern Liberties, District of Southwark,
or sand bar or island in front of said city, shall be made to the
board of wardens; Windmill Island is, beyond all doubt, covered by
one or both of the phrases,-" any part of the city," or "sand bar
or island in front of said city."
By the 5th section of the act of February 4th, 1846, a fine is
imposed upon any one who shall fix, or cause to be fixed, any bulk,
enclosure, or other obstruction in the tide way of the Delaware, upon
any sand bar or island in front of the city, and the wardens are
directed to have such obstruction abated or removed. And by the
7th section of the act of April 15th, 1850, it is declared that the
act of 1840 shall not be construed to impair the rights of the riparian owners of Windmill Island, or any part thereof, to low water
mark: These several acts seem to settle the question raised by the
third reason, conclusively against the position taken by the respondents; but if it rested alone upon the 7th section of the act of 1851,
upon which the application of the petitioner to the wardens was
based, there would be no escape from the discharge of the duty
therein enjoined, for the answer does not deny the ownership of the
land mentioned in the petition, nor is it disputed that it -is within
the limits of the port of Philadelphia, nor that it is bounded by the
Delaware river ; these three facts being admitted, or proved if denied, it is the duty of .the wardens to obey the directions of the act,
irrespective of the question of prior, limited, or general jurisdiction.
The fourth objection is embraced in the second, and for the reasons already given, is not deemed a sufficient answer to the prayer
of the petition.
The fifth answer is, that in point of fact it is impossible to fix the
line of low water mark as prayed for by the petitioner. But it will
not do to rest upon a mere assertion of inability; it is not pretended
that an effort has been made to comply with the directions of the
act, nor is the nature or character of the disability set out, that the
court may judge whether it -is a mere disinclination to perform the
duty required, or an actual impediment, which renders it impossible
for the respondents to do that which the law says they shall do.
The law recognizes a line of low water mark; it recognizes it as the

